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Stunkel: Technology and Values in Traditional China and the West: I

TECHNOLOGY AND VALUES IN
TRADITIONAL CHINA AND THE WEST: I

KE:\:\ETII R. STUNKEL

This essay is org-anized around two points. First, it was the
failure of traditional China to institutionalize available technolog-y and a spirit of technolog-ical innovation, especially in the
eig-hteenth and nineteenth centuries, that inf1uenced most profoundly the sad results of contlict with the West after 1840. The
much discussed non-development of science in the GalileanNewtonian mode is mostly irrelevant to an understanding- of
Chinese reluctance to mobilize a rich technological tradition for
an effective defense capable of preserving both political and
economic autonomy ag-ainst encroachments of the West.
Second, China's lack of interest in specific values associated
with steady tcchnolog-ical prog-ress and control of nature was not a
case of stag-nation or inertia, but rather a coherent and stubborn
expression in historical time of priorities radically different from
those which came to prevail in western Europe. Those priorities
were lodg-ed in stable, persistent social institutions and a sophisticated structure of ideas and values about nature. society, and
human nature.'
Terlmo[o,£,'j (lnd the Chinese "Puzzle"

Understanding- China's f~lilure to enter the modern world selfconsciously and advantag-eously, com pared to Japanese success
when bced with the same western challenge, has been linked to
the non-development of modern science in the Chinese empire.
This issue has generated wide debate and is variously pmed as
"Needham's Puzzle," the "Scientific Revolution problem," and
the "Great Question." How, that is, does one explain the absence
of 1l10denl science-meaning the Galilean/Newtonian notion~ nf
method, causation, and explanation crystallized in the scvcnteenth centllry-in a civilization so abundantly endowed with
75

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1990

1

...
Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 23 [1990], No. 23, Art. 5
76

c () Yf PA RAT 1 \' F

C11.1
1 1\' Z

,\1

():-; S R F \' 1 E W

promising scientific and technological achievements?2 The latter
facts have been documented by Joseph Needham and his collahorators in the monumental and still uncompleted Se/ena and
Civilization in China.:l
My contention is that the non-development of" modern science
was relatively unimportant for China's nineteenth ccntury crisis.
More fundamental was the failure of the Empire to achieve sustained institutionalization of its indigenous technology, either in a
modified market mode or a bureaucratic command mode ,so as to
promote deliberately a spirit of innovation and improvement,
especially in technologies bearing Oil warfare and industrialization such as iron production, time keeping, nautical science,
weapons manufacture (especially artillery), explosives production, and the like. This point invites a useful distinction between
scientific and technological rationality. The function of science is
to discover what is already present in nature-laws, processes,
and regularities not of human origin. Technology is a human
activity which creates or designs something not ill nature for
purposes of utility, control, and convenience-a seaworthy ship, it
bridge, a crossbow, a water wheel, a blast funlace f()!' iron smelting, all of which depend on laws of nature, but not necessarily on
knowledge of those laws.~
Theoretical science is not required to produce usable and
sophisticated technology, and it is not helpful to lump them
together or to say that technology is really applied science, which
merely fudges their distinctiveness as human enterprises." Nor
can it he assumed out of hand that in Europe there was significant
linkage between the two in the seventeenth century or perhaps
even earlier. Until the nineteenth century it is more likely that
technology developed in response to social, ecollomic and military pressures, especially the latter, than to scientific ideas. Until
quite recently progress in technology does ot seem to have required parallel progress in science as a precondition, although a
case to the contrary has been made that early inventions of' the
European industrial revolution were possible only hecause of
widespread scientific literacy and a mechanical w<\\ of'thinking.6
I f the latter view is correct, however, then oi1e is hard pressed to
explain Chinese accomplishments in mechanical engineering in a
culture whose governing ideas were non-mechanistic. The
Chinese were not unaccomplished in mathematics, notahly
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algebra, but m;lthematical study was pretty much a handmaiden
of the calendar. The belief system of the ruling elite viewed the
universe as a self~sustaining, self~operating organic system. Since
there was no Chinese law-giving creator, there were few perceived regularities in nature inviting specifically mathematical
description, and therefore no incentive to contrive a mechanical
frame of reference. Yet the Chinese still demonstrated a gift for
developing and using ingenious machines. 7
China had all impressive body of technology and various identifiable sciences, but there was no overarching conception of
,\(ierlcl' as a systematically experimental, quantitative approach to
natural phenomena whose findings were accumulated and
criticized over time. There were no philosophers like Aristotle,
Descartes, or Frallcis Bacon working on a common frame of
reference that would embrace all scientific inquiry. H There were
cum Illative tech nical traditions in which the work of predecessors
was studied and valued, hut these were tiliallineages (jia) in which
texts were invested with scriptural charisma, not schools like those
of ancient Creece in which texts were dealt with critically. These
Chinese traditions of medicine, alchemy, or mathematical harmonics were not traditions in the sense that Hugh Kearney u~es
the term to identify at least three coherent, competing approaches to nature in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe,
"each with their own assumptions about God, Nature, and scientific method"-;\Il organic tradition whose authorities were Aristotle ami Ptolemy, a magical tradition championed by people like
Bruno and Paracelsus, and a mechanist tradition that finally
triumphed through the work of Calileo and Newton. 9
Despite the existence of well organized scientific traditions in
Europe, the secret of western power at the time of the opium war
was not a scientifically driven technology, but a social order
friendly to technological improvement and change, which had
been institutionalized consciously within educational, commercial, and political frameworks. Central to the success of western
technology was a cluster of values-time discipline, efficiency, the
trut h value of practical results, and deliberate innovation-linked
to a conception of human nature that acknowledged active control of physical nature, and rationalized the accumulation and
exercise of ecollomic, military, and political power. Theoretical
science was of marginal importance. This was also true of China.
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Technology did not rely on science, which was the possession of
an educated class and transmitted in books. Technology was, on
the whole, in the hands of skilled artisans who transmitted their
knowledge directly to relatives and apprentices. I 0 The secret of
China's apparent ineptitude when finally confronted by western
mechanized power, despite a long historical record of invention,
was that a stable cultural tradition and a tightly oq.{anized social
order resisted the potentially disruptive effects of open ended
technological innovation and did not consistently exploit
achievements of the past. Thus Needham's Puzzle can be rephrased. Why did a civilization equipped with so much technological aptitude fail to institutionalize technological innovation and
rationality when it became politically and strategically imperative
to do so? The "scientific revolution problem" defers to the
"technological revolution problem."
Consider for a moment what China had done. Not only were
the inventions spectacular-paper, printing, the magnetic compass, the stern post rudder, the seismograph, trace and collar
harnesses, the segmental arch bridge, deep drilling, the mouldboard and plough share, the earliest vaccination, the first
cybernetic machine, fire arms, cast iron, and a host of engineering
devices such as the chain drive-a number of them passed to the
West through various intermediaries. II Needham argues that ...
most of the steam engine's anatomy had already come to the West
by the + 15th century ... ," namely the double acting principle of
piston and cylinder, and connecting- and piston-rod assemblies
for the interconversion of rectilinear and rotary motion. In the
case of gunpowder (hua yao), which was invented in the tenth
century A.D., military applications were made with explosive fire
arrows, grenades, and barrel guns between 969 and 1275 A.D.
Chinese armories mass produced cannon.12
It seems clear that for half a millennium from 1000 to 1500
China was preeminent in the world for wealth, military power,
and technological innovation. In the early Sung Dynasty an extensive coke-fired iron industry developed in the provinces of
Honan and Hopei, with iron production rising from 32,500 tons
in 998 to 125,000 tons in 1078. These were semi-capitalistic enterprises employing hundreds of workers, tied into extensive transportation networks, involving large-scale development of metal
and coal resources, applying advanced technology (e.g., blast
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furnaces fed by a continuous flow of air), reqUlrmg complex
financial transactions, and used to provide metal for coins, construction, tools, weapons, and body armor. While the extensive
Sung navy was designed to operate mainly on rivers and canals,
the Ming navy in the early fifteenth century was an open-ocean
force capable of overwhelming several European states combined
with its 1,350 combat ships. Kublai Khan sent more than 4,000
ships against Japan in 1281. In the first half of the fifteenth
century, wide-ranging tributary fleets of the Ming admiral Cheng
Ho were capable of asserting a military and commercial empire as
far as the eastern coast of Africa. His largest vessel displaced some
1,500 tons (Vasco da Gama's flagship displaced 300 tons), and was
eq lIal to navigation across the Pacific. 13 Chinese military technology and industrial accomplishments anticipated those of Europe
by several hundred years, and the scale was sometimes awesome.
When these feats were repeated in the West they established
Europen supremacy in the world. Why did the early initiatives
falter and slump into desuetude? With such a reservoir of precedents, why were the Chinese unable to revive, mobilize, and
augment them after 1840?
Wen Yuan Qian argues that China failed to develop modern
science because of stagnation. 14 Much of his argument could be
applied to the absence of sllstained technological innovation as
well. The trouble with this stagnation hypothesis, which has been
shared by many, is that Qian blames traditional Chinese civilization for not self-consciously preparing itselfto meet challenges of
the modern world, a palpably unhistoricalline of argument. In
the context of China's present comparative weakness as a modernizing nation, he excoriates traditional Confucian rationalizations of despotism and agrarianism, its reliance on moral
interpretations of the past to guide the present, and its domination of an educational and civil service system shaped by literary
studies. Like Hu Shih (1891-1962) before him, who fled Chinese
tradition for democracy, evolution, and John Dewey, the first
Chinese intellectual to make such a clean break, he repudiates
wholly the influence of "The Antique Shop of Confucius and
Sons." On the other hand, those institutions and ideas which
account for China's longevity as a civilization can be viewed historically as signs of strength. A legitimate reading of Chinese civilization is to stress its persistent stability for some two thousand years
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following the First Empire of221 B.C., even allowing for violent
dynastic transitions and a long period of disunity between the
Han and Sui Dynasties. Despite China's troubles in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, it is not misguided to be impressed by
such uncommon staying power and continuity, and to see it as an
exemplary historical achievement.
Let us suppose that a K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927) and the educational, administrative, and economic reforms of the 100 days of
1898, including a constitutional monarchy, encouragement of
invention, permission for Manchus to become traders, the establishment of bureaus to promote agriculture, industry and commerce, the right of all officials and subjects to direct suggestions to
the throne-all supported by the Tao-kuang Emperor-had
been the response in 1841 to the crisis ofthe Opium War":; Would
it have made a difference? I think not. The Confucian mandarinate was not inclined to reform China on some quasi-radical
model any more than the "enlightened despot" Joseph I I was able
to reform the Austrian Empire through decree at t he end of the
eighteenth century.16 Sung proto-industrialization was first promoted and then discouraged by the bureaucracy when it was
perceived as a threat to social balance. The imbalance came from
placing too much wealth in the hands of merchants and too much
power in the hands of generals, which undermined the agricultural sector on the one hand, and the ruling elite on the other.
Europeans relished a symbiotic relationship between armaments
and money making after the fifteenth century. For the Chinese
literati it was less desirable to accumulate wealth than to keep
merchants in their place, and better to risk military defeat (in
Sung times passive defense was actually chosen over active detense, which led to the loss of north China) than to risk an
unmanageable army always hungry for the latest technology.17
The readiness for change in all social classes and institutions
requisite to comprehensive reform of familiar wavs was absent.
There was no conspiracy by the governing elite to squash
capitalism or to hamstring technology. For Confucian literati, the
cultural and social air they breathed, and the restraints it imposed, seemed as natural and fundamentally real as the water in
which a fish swims. So it seemed also for virtually everyone else in
Chinese society. Chinese talent was equal to industrialization,
technological innovation, and sophisticated commercial oq~ani-
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zation well before Europeans embarked on those paths, but values of social harmony and "change within tradition" asserted
themselves over the impulse to seek power through wealth and
technology. After the great upsurge of innovation and commercial experimentation between the Sung and early Ming periods,
Chinese initiatives retreated into the cau tious stability of the Ming
and Ch'ing dynasties, which together stretched from 1368 to 1911
A.D., well over 500 years, the very time span in which the West
began to experience its scientific and technological progress, accompanied by unprecedented social, religious, economic, and
political upheaval.! H The brilliance was still there, but not to serve
ends of technological control and innovation.
Consider an instructive example in civil engineering-bridge
building, which has im plications both for commerce and defense.
In nineteenth century Europe traditional building materials of
wood and stone were challenged and, in some special cases, displaced by the use of industrialized iron. The new material led to
the creation of 1I0vei engineering forms. Thus Thomas Telford,
functioning as a public servant, was throwing cast-iron arches
over rivers in the first decades of the century, taking full advantage ofthe new technology to transform an important category of
public works. Motivated to combine strength and beauty, he
modulated quickly from arches to cables and from cast-iron to
wrought-iron. The 150 foot-span Craigellachie Bridge over the
Spey River in Scotland (1814), an iron-arched structure, is still
standing. Telford's Menai Straits suspension bride in Wales
(1826), a spectacular 580-foot-span, wrought-iron structure, the
longest in the world for its time, also still with us, becanle in
inspiration for similar structures into the twentieth century and
was a symbol of pre- Victorian industrial power and innovative
genius.!9
These structures erupted on the world very suddenly through
one man whose pragmatic genius was recognized and given scope
by the social order. Telford and others institutionalized the use of
industrialized iron as a universal material of structural engineering. H is designs had a pervasive im pact on an engineering profession and public consciousness. Telford's work came from the
insight that cast-iron could carry many times the load of wood or
stone, and hence is superior in strength, durability, and economy.
His structures were possible because of a social order that valued
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such public works at low cost. As an author of treatis.es and
president of the first civil engineering society he disseminated his
views to a receptive public, and "industrialized iron came to
define the course of technology and society as a whole."20 By the
end of the century Gustav Eiflel gave French nationalism and
industrial aspirations a shot in the arm with the world's tallest
tower, erected from prefabricated iron parts, the forebears of
that famous work being a whole series of railroad viaducts Eiffel
built in the Massif Centrale by government commission. An iron
tower became a symbol of national power and technological
greatness. 21

The Chinese built segmental arched and suspension bridges
very early and in many locations. 22 The materials were bamboo,
wood, stone, hemp, and iron suspension chains. The arched
bridges were chiefly masonry structures. In time the suspension
bridges were using wrought-iron chains for support anchored in
masonry abutments. Taken as individual physical artifacts these
structures could be impressive. Thus the An-Lan suspension
bridge at Kuanhsien, fabricated of wood, hemp, and bamboo, has
eight spans (the longest is 200 feet) totaling 1050 feet. 23 The
Chin-Lung iron-chain bridge crossing the Yangtze in Yunnan
Province has a single span of 328 feet carried by 18 chains. 24 The
Wan-Nien Bridge at Nanching spans 1,803 feet over the Ju Shui
River with no less than 24 arches. 25 These structures are admirable and China's priority in conceiving and executing them must
be acknowledged. On the other hand, bridge building was a local
initiative in China which had only slight potential for absorbing
technical improvements. Once certain forms were in place they
were sufficient to meet traditional needs, which was mainly foot
traffic and light loads. Moreover, "everything seems to have been
done by traditional eotechnic methods showing little or no trace
of modern inf1uence."26 The Wan-Nien Bridge illustrates very
well the role of traditional technics in China. It was completed in
1647 on the initiative of a provincial official. It was damaged by
f100ds in 1887 and repairs were undertaken by one Hsieh Kantang, who wrote a rare book about the event. The entire job was
managed by Hsieh and his associates without pay, subscriptions
provided funds for the work and materials, and many workers
joined in for the sake of Buddhist piety. The imperial government provided no help at all. There was no program for reasses-
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sing engineering options or developing new technology in the
Ministry of Public Works. The Wan Nien initiative was an ad hoc
operation with little potential for impact beyond the local area,
Hsieh's treatise on the work nothwithstanding. 27 It was technology from beginning to end in the service of stability, order, and
tradition, not deliberate innovation. It never occurred to Hsieh
that he might exploit China's experience with industrialized iron
and reduce future flood damage by experimenting with iron
clamps between the masonry arches of the Wan Nien Bridge.
lIomeostatic vers1ls Dynamic Change

Qian's hypothesis of inertia and stagnation is historically less
satisfying and helpful than Needham's idea of homeostasis, that
is, the tendency of Chinese civilization in times of trouble and
imbalance to seek equilihrium rather than to develop new social,
political, and economic forms, the most spectacular instance
being the three tumultuous centuries of disunity following the
collapse of the Han Dynasty in the second century A.D. Following
a series of succession states and the domestication of Buddhism to
Chinese conditions, the empire was reestablished in the sixth
century under Confucian auspices, an extraordinary and highly
improbable feat, perhaps as improbable as the development of
modern science in Europe. 2H In contrast, the disintegration of
western Roman civilization about the same time led to the
emergence of a new civilization in medieval Europe. Needham is
right to point out that "the built-in instability of European society
must ... be contrasted with the homeostatic equilibrium of
China .... "29 This tendency to equilibrium was served by mutually reinfc)rcing social, economic, and intellectual patterns organized on a principle of interactive relatedness. The outcome
was an organic model of humanity, society, and nature within
which the assertive ideals were adjustment and harmonization
rather than change and conflict. Technological innovation, like
all other change, responded to "the Chinese fondness for solutions which permit lesser change to occur within a greater permanency."30 This remained true virtually to the end of the dynastic
period, despite sharp criticism of traditional correlative thinking
by Ch'ing scholars like Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692) and others.31
Western Europe was always off balance because of its geo-
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graphical propinquity with Western Asia and Africa, and a diversified, often contradictory historical legacy-Greco-Roman secularism, rationalism, and humanism, Christian otherworldliness,
faith, and God centeredness, rival kingdoms, republics, and principalities, confused dynastic claims, and conflicting legal jurisdictions. Most important was European curiosity after the Middle
Ages about unknown lands and a marked receptivity to outside
influences. For example, the transmission of texts by Aristotle
and Ptolemy to the University of Paris from Toledo in the 12th
century revolutionized Christian thought and provided a
stimulus to scientific revolution in the sixteenth century, and
Europe's era of aggressive geographical exploration and discovery in the Renaissance promoted irreversible economic, social
and technological change. Europeans seemed to thrive on conflict
and uncertainty. They came to rely on innovation and change as a
source of power, security, and leverage in an environment of
competitive political and military aspirations. The restless inventive temperament and individualism of Leonardo da Vinci was
markedly un-Chinese and recognizably European.
While differences between the two civilizations must explain in
the end historical paths they actually took, there were many
striking similarities prior to the nineteenth century, all of which
bear in some way on technological development, thus intensifying
the puzzle of China's disastrous clash with the West. Both civilizations relied heavily on an agricultural base. Both had political and
social orders resistant to change-China its ruling class of
"scholar-gentry" and Europe its Old Regime. Both had considerable wealth generated by commercial and financial activities of a
~nerchant class, potential capital for investment in prod uctive and
innovative undertakings. Both had thriving town life, a Sung
Dynasty phenomenon with the Chinese, a Renaissance development with Europeans. Both mounted large-scale productive enterprises involving large n umbers of workers and t he leadership
of merchants, nothing less than incipient capitalism. Both devised
advanced methods for commercial and financial transactionsChina's "flying money," proto-banks, and promissory notes,
Europe's double entry bookkeeping, joint stock companies, and
international trade. Both had military establishments linked to
proto-capitalist methods of production. Both had a correlative
way of thinking about nature and society that featured organic
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correspondences. Both had ingenious technological aptitude.
Both had developed what Braudel calls "the three great
technological 'revolutions' between the fifteenth and eighteenth
centuries. , ,"-artillery, printing, and ocean navigation.~2
But it was differences nested in these similarities that collectively diverted China from progressive technological development. Conditions in Europe favored an outlook that was quantitative, controlling, innovative, and entrepreneurial, which undermined feudal institutions by reoq~anizing and redirecting human
energies to produce wealth for the sake of military and political
power. Historical experiences and conditions in the West favored
technological innovation in part because change, measurement,
mechanical arts, power, and the calculating mind acquired dignity. Human nature embodied a rational, manipulative mind
oriented outward to an intelligible natural order created by God,
The metaphor of God as creative Artisan pointed to similar
powers in man, These values were supported and strengthened
by specific institutional arrangements and incentives in the
monarchies and republics of western Europe.
Monmouth College

I\()TES
l. The Wadc-( ;iles system oftranslitcratioll is used in this essay, Pinyin
appears in some quotations and in the names of recent Chinese authors,
2, On the "puule," sec Wen-yuan Qian, TIl{' (;rmt Inertia: Scientijic
(London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp, 92-94),
Stllgllatioll In Tradiliona!
and Nathan Sivin, "Whv the Scientific Revolution Did Not Take Place in
China-or Didn't It?", 'in Li Guohao, et aI., Exp/orations in the Jfis/my oj
SOfllCl' (llld Tnhl/o/II,!.,') in Chiua (Shanghai: Shanghai Chinese Classics
Publishing Iiouse, 1982), p, 89, Needham alludes to the puzzle, or
paradox, throughout his writings, Scholal'ship, he says, is concelned not
onlv with what the Chinese did, "but why thev did not succeed, as
ELII:ope\ civilization did, in giving rise to rru)(lfTu s~'ience and technology,
Whv did their science and technology always remain primarily empirical' \Vhv was thnt' no indigenous industrial revolution in China? That, I
believe, i, one of the greatest problems of all comparative social histon, , ." Ctnk., (ll/d Cm/I.l1Il1'll in China anri Ihe West (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversitY' Press, 1970), p, 72, In another place he says the question to be answered is "the failure of two great Asian civilizations, China
and India, to develop spontaneously modern science and technology,"
Thl' (;mnd Titm/ioll (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 177,
This is one of three big themes that tt)rm Needham's conceptual frame of
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reference like a triple fugue. The second is: "why had China been more
successful than Europe in gaining scientific knowledge and applying it
for human benefit for fourteen previous centuries?" Joseph Needham,
Ilistory and Human Values: A Perspective for World Science and Technology
(Montreal: McGill University, 1975), p. 2. The third has to do with how
"the river of Chinese science and technology "flowed, like all other such
rivers into the sea of modern science and technology." Joseph Needham,
Science in Traditional China: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 9-10.
3. Needham and his collaborators have produced six volumes to date,
some divided into "parts" because of their copiousness, which yields an
actual total of 15 volumes. Science and Civilization in China, 6 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959-). This key work is cited
hereafter as sec. There are critical reviews ofthe project by Lynn White,
.Ir. and Jonathan Spence inlsis, 75:276 (March 1984): 171-189. There is
an abridgement of sec in the making, which one might expect to ease
somewhat the task of seeing the f()rest through the trees, much like D. C.
Somervell's useful abridgement ofToynbee's A Study o/History. Unf()rtunately Ronan's compressions do not always preserve the integrity of
Needham's arguments and insights, and is no substitute ti)!' direct reference to sec. So far there are two volumes in the abridgement covering
the first three volumes and a section of volume I V: I of scc. See Colin
Ronan, The Shorter Scienc('
Civilization
and
in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978-).
4. Frederick Kilgour notes an "almost total absence of technological
innovation in colonial America." But in the half century after independence, "Americans produced a baker's dozen of m<~jor technological innovations," not because of science, but because of a new competitiveness,
high labor costs, the stimulus of English industrialization, and legislation
such as the Patent Act of 1790. "Technological I nnovatioll in the United
States,"Journal o/World History, 8:4 (1965), p. 745. In Europe thel'e was "a
truly scientific technology" in the development of instruments used by
science. John Burke (ed.), Th" Uses 0/ Scienrf" in the Age 0/ Newton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 106-107. Theoretical
astronomy did serve a practical need; thus (;iovanni Cassini's late seventeenth century almanac gave eclipse times of Jupiter's moons that permitted a determination of longitude on land, and there was clearly some
relevance of astronomical knowledge to John Harrison's chronometer,
the instrument which solved the problem of finding longitude at sea. On
the other hand, Harrison really licked the problem by reducing irregularity in a mechanical time keeper caused by temperature changes and
friction in the escapement, not by applying theoretical ast ronomy. Ibid.,
pp. 150, 155-161. There was also some linkage between practical needs
and the kinds of problems scientists chose to pursue, as in the case of
seventeenth century gunnery, but the outcomes were technically insignificant. Ibid., p. 136. Carlo Cipolla holds that " ... the resources of
craftsmanship were strengthened by the systematic application of scientific principles ... ," which is not the same as saying the fill'mer depended

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol23/iss23/5

12

Stunkel: Technology and Values in Traditional China and the West: I
Kenneth R Stunkel

87

on the latter. Clocks and Culture, 1300-1700 (New York: W. W. Norton,
1977), p. ~6. None of this justifies claims that technology was the off:~pr
ing of science ill eady modern Europe.
5. A. Wolf rescues technolot,'Y from being "applied science" and states
my p()sition succinctly: "the invention of things and pl'ocesses, on the one
hand, and the discovel'y of their nature and laws on the other hand, al'e
activities which may be pursued mOlT or less independently, and have
been so pursued in the eadier history of civilization, though, with the
growth of knowledge, they tend to become closely intedinked," A History,
Scienre, Ter/molo,!.,'Y, and PhifosojJhy in thr 16th & 17th Centurirs (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1935), pp, 450-451. FOI' example, the innovative Scottish
builder of industrialized iron bridges in the eady nineteenth century,
Thomas Telford, made no use of Galileo or Newton, "had little use for
the science of his day, was untrained in mathematical f()rmulations, and
made few i fany calculations f(lI' his designs." The Tower and the Bridge: The
New Art 0/ Strurtural EngineerinK (Princeton, N,].: Princeton University
Press, 198~), pp. 41-42, Robert Merton, in a new introduction to his 1938
classic, Seienre, Technology and S()(iety in Sr1l('nteenth Cn!tllry EnKland (New
Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978), says about the section on military and
economic effects on science that "it distinguishes throughout ... between
science and technology, an essential distinction that ... was not unif()rmly made bat k in the days when th'e monograph was written and one
that is often blurred even today." Ibid., p. xiii. For a cautious dissenting
point of view, see Edwin Layton,Jr., "Technology and Science, or 'Vive la
petite difference.' PSA: Procerdinp oftlte Rimnial MedinK of the Philosophy
of Seiena AssocZatl(Jr/ 2 (1976), pp, 173 fT.
6. Margaret Jacob argues that "a balanced account of the historical
conditions within which industrialization might occur must add scientific
knowledge of a specifically mechanical sort. .. " The Cultuml MraninK 0/
that Scienti/ir Rfl'olutiort (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1988), p, 181.
Sorting out othel' views on relations of technology and science, see
Fernand Braudel, who places their "conjunction" in the eighteenth century, cites a number of earlier exceptions, and remarks wisely th~lt "no
innovation has allY value except in l'e1ation to the social pressure which
maintains and imposes it." The Strurtures ofEl!eryda'l Ufe: Thr Limits o/the
Possihlr (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 431. A. Cbbelodhe holds
that science begins to shape technology in earnest "with the study or
val'ious f()I'ms of ellergy." Charles Singer, et aI., A lIistory o/Technology, 5
\Ols, (Oxf()ni: Clarendon Press, 1954-19SH), IV: 677, David Landes sees
110 significant linkage of technology to science before ca, 1850,
"Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western
Europe, 1750-1814," ill M, Postan and II, Habakklls (eds,), CamhridKe
Eronomic History oj EllrojJ(, 6 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1952-1965), 6: 29~-294). For a conclllTing view, see Maurice
Daumas, "Le ml'the de la revolution technique," Rf'1'u( d'histoire drs sriences, 16 (1963): 291-302, Thomas Kuhn holds that bef()re the clear
impact of science Oil technology in the organic-chemical dye industry in
the 1870's alld ill the electric power industry in the 1890's, scientists
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succeeded only in "validating and explaining, not in illlproving techniques developed earlier and without science's aie\." "Ilistory and the
History of Science," Daedalus (Spring 1971), pp. 2H4-2H5. One finds
everywhere in Needham's writings the assumption th:!t science and
technology are inseparable. FOI' example: "When we say that modern
technology did not develop, we mean that the s{ienr!' (mv italics) of the
Chinese always remained empirical, and its theories were confined to
those of 'primitive' type, such as the Yin Yang principlt-s and the Five
Elements." Clrrk.\ lind Craftsmen, p. 76. 5.
7. On the immense range of Chinese mechanical engineering de\'eloped in an "organic" cultural milieu, see sec, 1V, 2: jmsslm. A. G,
Keller argues that mathematical study was important to technological
advances in sixteenth century Italy because of the premium on developing effective artillery. See ".Mathematicians, Mechanics, and Experimental Machines," in Maurice Cosland (cd), The Fml'rf!,Prla oj SIIOla in WestPrn
EurojN (:-..lew York: Macmillan Press, 1975), p. 16. On the relation of
mathematical thinking to Chinese civili/.ation, the most recent work is by
Jean-Claude Martzlofl', flistoire drs mllthemaliqlll.lrhino!.I!•.1 (Paris: Masson,
19HH). Mart/JofT has changed minds about the ability of Chinese
mathematicians to produce rigorous proofs, especially their understanding of Euclid's methods. But notational problems tended to hold them
back, and "it is striking that throughout Chinese history the main importance of mathematics was in relation to the calendar." sec, I I I: 152.
H. For discussion of what might be meant by Chinesl' "science" and
"scientific tradition" in CUTTent scholarship. see Nathan Sivin's state of
the art review, "Science and Medicine in Imperial China-The State of
the Field," The journal 0/ Asian Stlldlel, 47:1 (Fehruary 19HH). While
:'\cedharn tends to fuse science and technology in the Chinese tradition,
Sivin avoids lumping them together and distinguishes nine "selfconscious sciences" and has Iitt Ie to sav about tech noiogy. I hid., pp.
43-44, and 46-47 on Needham's assumptions, While explorations in
these sciences--sllch as mathematics, llIedicine, alchemy, geolllancvhd\'e produced a suhstantial recent literature, Net'dham's work in sec
remains indispensable and unique for detailed accounts of Chinese
tech nologv.
~J. See Hugh Keamev, Seiencl' (Ind Chrmgl', /5{){)-/7{)(} (New York:
.\1cGr,lw Hill, 1971), p. 48 on ElIJ'()pean scientific "t raditions." One might
argue that the natur;!iistic systems of Yin-Yang and the Five Elements,
particularly the latter, were a "tradition." But rather than pn)viding a
basis for systematic, testable observation of phenomena, as did the Aristotelian idea of qualitative change, the nco-Platonic concept oj
mil rocosm-llIacrocosrn, or the Cartesian notion of llIeciIanicallaws, the~
were used to \orll1ulate a complicated system of symbolic correlation's
whose divinational and quasi philosophical applications were ilion"
sought after' than critical explorations of nature. The correlative approach to cataloglling and explaining phenolllena was not aho\'e sharp
(TiticisllI (e.g., the Han skeptic Wang Chung), but it did not lead to
fundamental conceptual change. :-..leedham notes that "the llIore elaho-
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rate and fanciful t he symbolic cOlTelations became, the further away
froll! observation of Nature the whole sYstem tended. Bv the time of the
Sung (+ II t h t ('nt my) it was probably' having a definitely deleterious
eflect Oil the great scientific movement which then developed."
II:
261-266. On.,pccifically Chincse notions of science and tradition, see
Sivin, "Science and Meditinc in Imperial China," pp. 42-13. On the
absence of COlllmon ground f(lI' the sciences in China, sec Nathan Sivin's
account of the Sung Dynasty polymath Shen Kua in "Why the Scientific
Re\'()lution Did \lot Take Place in China~Or Didn't It?", pp. 90-93.
10. Si\in, ibid., p. 90.
II. For a useful tallv oflhe most important Chinese inventions and the
ones that probably reached the West, see Charles Singer, et a!., A. lIistory
o/TI'Clill%,I.,"!, 5 \ o Is. (OXI(lrd: Clarendon P!"('ss, 1954-195H): 11,770-771.
Sec also Joseph Needham, The Cram! Titratioll, pp. 34. 52, IHH, 213. 14;
\leedham, Clerk, fllld Cmjtslfll'll, p. 62. Ill' believes a possible mechanism
of transmission was Il!ovement to Italy through the slave trade, from the
:\Iiddle Ages into the fifteenth century, of numerous Tartars (Mongols)
who became servants. I bid., p. 61.
.
12. For details on this Chinese lineage of the steam engine, see seC', IV,
2: ;)HO-3H7. The first Chinese steamships emerged from the Kiangnan
Arsenal and the Fuchow Dockvard in IH6H, but too late to redress the
advantage of the western power~. Ibid .. 390. See also Wang Ling, "On the
In\"(.'ntion and l :se of Cunpowder and Fireanns in China," in Nathan
Sivin «'d.), Srin/(p fllld T('(lm%gy il/ f.·asl Asia (New York: Science lIistory
Publications. 1977), pp. 157-ISH.
13. A stimulating analysis of Chinese commercial and technological
dnelopment between 1000 and 150() is in William McNeill, Tltl' Pursuit oj
Pown: Terhll%,1!,l'. Socil't,'
Armed Sinrt'
Fo/"(t, and
A..D. f()OO (Chicago:
Lniversity of Chicago I'ress. 19H2), pp. 24-50. Of special interest on
Chinese pnlto-clpitalism in metallurgical industries in Roben Hartwell's
inlormatin' ":vLtrkets, Technoloh'Y, and the Structure of Enterprise in
the Development of the Eleventh-Centurv Chinese Iron and Steel Industn," jO/lll/a/ oj Fmllomic /listory. 26: I (March 19(6): 29-58, and Joseph
Needham and Wang I.ing, The DI'1'e/ojimenl
Steel Technology
Iron
oj
and
in
Chilll1 (Lolldon: :"<iewcotllcn, 1958). Ray H liang notes that "the Song
dynasty was a period of tedll1ological innovation," but that "in the experience of Wntern Ellrope such a breakthrough came at a mOIllent
when the influellce of commerce outweighed that of agricultural production by some margin," while "China in the early modern era did not
come close to his jumping-olT point." China: A Marro llis/ory (Armonk,
N.Y.: \1. F. Shalpe, 19HH).
p.
133.011 Chinese navics ami Cheng Ho, see
sec, IV. 3: 477-191.
H. Qiall's kl') assumptioll is that "software decides," meaning the
,ocial s"lructure. language. and hureautTacy of traditional China were
decisin'. and Ilot "hardware." that is. the availability of tools and
machilles. The Ilon-developlllellt of science, and by extension, technology. was due to "'the nOll-development of modern ecollomy. modern
politic" and moderll Clliturc." Thl' (;rm/ II/ertia, p. 24. What Needham

sec,
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calls a tendency of Chinese civilization to move fnlm disturbance or
disruption to "equilibrium," the principle of homeostasis, Qian calls
"inertia." Ibid., pp. 94-95. Compare II. G. Creel's view that cady imperial
China had many of the features associted with twentieth-century superstates-notably strong centralil.ation and sophisticated bllI'eauCI'atic organization. Ray Huang, Taxation and (;Ollernmental Finante in SixteenthCentury Ming China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ]974), p.
309. Huang lays his fingel' on a featuI'e of the entire late imperial period
when he points out that "the Ming I'epresented an attempt to impose an
extremely ambitious centralil.ed system on an enormous empire before
its level of technology had made such a degree of centralization practiraL" Needed were "transportation, communication, other service
facilities, the principles of money and banking, techniques of accounting
and data processing, and even the mental attitude of the officials." Ibid.,
p.313.
15. For an account of Kang's proposals in IR9R, see Emmanuel C. Y.
Hsu, The Rile o/lVioriern China (New York: Oxfilrd University Press,
1970), pp. 434-443. On the tension between K'ang's instrumentalism and
his Confucian traditionalism, see Richard Howard, "K'ang Yu-wei
(lR58-1927): His Intellectual Background and Early Thought," in A.
Wright and D. Twitchett (eds.), Conti/clan Personalities (Stanford: Stanfi>rd University Press, 1962), pp. 312-316.
16. "The EmperorJoseph II died in 1790, having Eliled in the attempt
to rule according to reason a state not constructed according to reason."
Crane BI'inton, A Derade 0/ Re,lo/lltiou, 1789-1799 (New York: Ilarper &
Row, 1934), p. 78.
17. McNeill notes generously: "Howevel' costly their policies may have
been in the long run, westerners in the twentieth centllI'y can surely
sympathize with the problem Confucian officials faced in trying to balann: one disturbing element-professionalized violence-against
another equally disturbing element-pn)fessionalized pursuit of profit.
Neither conformed to traditional pl'Opriety .... Uninhibited linkage
between military and commercial enterprise, such as was to take place in
f(lllrteenth- to nineteenth-century Europe, would have seemed disastrous to Chinese ofricials." Thl' Pursuit 0/ Power, p. 40. With regard to
bureaucratic eft{H'ts to marginalize military influence through financial
controls, the drive towards capitalism was thereby dampened. In the
West professional armies were at the center of public finance. Indeed,
"armies were of overwhelming importance fill' the development of
capitalism ... , supplied the first great markets fil!' mass consumption in
modern times ... , and were the only large-scale purchasers of iron
pn.ducts in the middle of the cighteenth centuI·Y." Walter Dorn,Cornpetilio/l/or Ern/lire, 1740-1763 (New York: Harper & Row, 1940), p. 15.
IR. J K. Fairbank and E. Reischauer sce the stability of traditional
Chinese civilil.at.ion as an obvious I'eason f(lr Elilure to ITloderni/e. On the
,>ther hand, "the comparison with the I'Cvolutionary ,ll1d expanding
society of the West should not be permitted to stigmatil.c the Ming and
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Ch'ing periods as retrogressive, or to overshadow their real achievements, for the Ming and Ch'ing saw many important developments in
Chinese civilization." East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1958 and 1960), p. 291.
19. Billingtoll, The Tower and the Rrid{if, pp. 30-37. On the early Chinese
use of iron and steel, see Needham, The Grand Titration, pp. 101-104.
20. Ibid., p. 29.
21. Ibid., pp. 60-71.
22. For a glance at bridge building of various types in traditional
China, see the j(lld-out map in SCC, IV, 3, between pp. 208-209. See the
Table on segmental arch bridges in China and the West, Ibid. 181.
Int()rmation 011 24 iron-chain sllspension bridges is detailed in another
table, Ibid., 194-195. The longest span listed for an iron-chain bridge is
some 430 feet. The shortest is 50 feet.
23. Ibid., Plate CCCLI V, Figure 848.
24. Ibid., Plate CCCLVII, Figure 854.
25. For an example of such an arched bridge, see Ibid., Plate CCCL,
Figure 841.
26. Ibid. 173.
27. Ibid.
28. "The world that the Sui leaders aspired to unite once more into a
single political and cultural order was immensely complex, comparable
... to that of Charlemagne's Europe, with the orthodox and legitimist
pretensions of the East Roman Empire thrown in." Arthur Wright, The
Sui Dynasty (l\:ew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 21. On the
reeme"gence of Confucianism, this time rivaled by the material and
spiritual power of Buddhism, see Ibid., pp. 120-123.
29. Needham, The (;rand Titration, p. 214.
30. Derk Bodde, "Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy, in
Arthur Wright (eeL), Studies in Chinese Thought (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953), p. 51.
31. Even the "elatively bold ideas of K'ang Yu-wei on historical development and the three ages (san-shih) were couched in the mode of
correlative thinking and correspondences. John B. Henderson, The Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 199.
32. Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Liti>, p. 385.
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